What are the democracy effects of 'decentralisation' reforms and projects? Most developing countries have launched decentralisation reforms for the purpose of improving service delivery, local development and management. In these reforms and projects, however, governments, international development agen­cies and large non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are transferring power to a wide range of local in­stitutions, including private bodies, customary authorities and NGOs. Recognition of these other local institutions means that fledgling local governments are receiving few public powers and face competition for legitimacy. Under what conditions is the new plurality of approaches and local interlocutors fostering local democratic consolidation or resulting in fragmented forms of authority and belonging? Through case studies in Benin, Guatemala, India, Malawi, Russia, Senegal and South Africa, this issue explores the effects of institutional choices and recognition by governments, international development agencies and large NGOs on three dimensions of democracy: 1) representation, 2) citizenship and 3) the public domain. This article outlines an approach to the politics of institutional choice and recognition while drawing out findings from the articles in this issue.

New institutions created through decentralisation policies around the world, notwithstanding the rhetoric, are often lacking in substantive democratic content. New policies for decentralised natural resource man­agement have transferred powers to a range of local authorities, including private associations, customary authorities and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Scholars see such transfers as detrimental to the legitimacy of local democratic institutions, leading to a fragmentation of local authority and dampening prospects for democratic consolidation. In much of this critique, however, there is limited attention to the wider democratic context (or lack thereof) and its effect on local governments. This article develops the concept of political articulation to characterise the relationship between citizens and elected representa­tives, and argues that accountability in decentralisation cannot be conceptualised or analysed separately from the accountability of higher institutions of representation and governance. The empirical analysis of the article uses the experience of a World Bank-funded Ecodevelopment Project in Himachal Pradesh, India, to generate insights into the role of political articulation in analysing decentralisation reforms.

Karelia is a forestry-rich region on Russia's northwestern frontier. This article shows how institutional arrangements for local government were a product of contending efforts of western donors and other transnational actors, the federal and regional governments, and the municipalities. Russia's re-centrali­sing reforms and broader authoritarian context notwithstanding, Karelia illustrates how the choice of lo­cal institutions, and ideas about representation and citizenship are increasingly shaped by actors beyond the central state. Borrowing insights from J.S. Migdal and J.C. Ribot, this article argues that the result is shifting cognitive boundaries and 'fragmented belonging' in a dynamic process of contestation and re­contestation of citizenship.

Forestry decision-making is still largely centralised in Guatemala. Nevertheless, elected municipal gov­ernments can now play a key role in local forest management. These local governments, with some ex­ceptions, are the principal local institutions empowered to participate in natural resource authority. Some theorists argue that such elected local officials are the most likely to be representative and downwardly accountable. But do these political institutions have the ability to represent the interests of minority and historically excluded or oppressed groups? Latin American indigenous movements are fighting for new conceptions of democracy and practices of representation that recognise collective rights and respect for customary law and authority. How does this approach weigh against elected local government? This arti­cle compares how elected municipal governments versus traditional indigenous authorities represent the interests of indigenous communities in forest management. It traces the historical context of relations be­tween indigenous people and the state in the region, and then presents the findings from case studies in two Guatemalan municipalities. The article finds that both authorities have some strengths as well as im­portant weaknesses, thus supporting arguments for the reinvention of both liberal democracy and tradi­tion in the interest of inclusive citizenship.

Beyond local development, the political agenda of decentralisation in West Africa was the restoration of state legitimacy and power, and some enhancement of local democracy. The mix of local institutions created in preceding participatory development projects resulted in fragmented forms of authority. Elsewhere, lo­cal communities have developed their own institutions for managing local affairs. How in such a context do elected local governments wield power, recognise other authorities and contribute to restoration of national state legitimacy? The Lokoly forest in Benin was never subject to state intervention. The Toui-Kilibo forest, however, has been a protected state forest since 1940 and a site for participatory forest management projects since early 1990s. In both cases, the public domain has been enclosed and local government legitimacy over forest resource management contested, hampering the formation of a so-called democratic local government. This article compares these two cases, elaborating on social actors' strategies in the symbolic construction and channelling of power, and on the challenges local governments face when attempting to wield legitimate authority over public spaces and articulate local politics to national state building.

This article illustrates how the use of village committees to manage natural resources in the Malidino Biodiversity Community-based Reserve was inconsistent with democratic decentralisation objectives. Ostensibly participatory projects that create village committees bestow discretionary power on traditional leaders who are not popularly accountable and have a poor track record of serving women's needs. This article interrogates how participatory approaches used in the Malidino reserve shaped the gender distribu­tion of outcomes in decision processes, access to forest resources and land, incomes and economic activi­ties, biodiversity conservation, and rural community empowerment and social change. It also shows how donor sponsored participatory approaches might exacerbate party politics, and through them, ethnic, kin­ship and gender cleavages by bestowing power and authority on actors belonging to a rival party and on actors with questionable democratic legitimacy. Both, the participatory parallel institutions and local governments, serve to undermine women's ability to collectively address their own interests.

To establish 'participatory' fisheries management, in 1993 Malawi's Fisheries Department constituted elected Beach Village Committees (BVCs) with village headmen as ex-officio members. But, struggles between elected BVC members and traditional authorities (TAs) over benefits from fisheries undermined the authority of elected members. Legal ambiguity on who should make decisions facilitated the takeover by headmen. Further, the BVC was elected by the population as a whole, representing more than just the fishers, whom these committees were designed to control. This resulted in the sabotaging of the BVCs activities by the fishers. Under these conditions, representing the whole population undermined the effec­tiveness of the BVCs. In 1998, decentralisation reforms placed 'community inclusion' in fisheries man­agement under Village Development Committees (VDCs), whose members would be appointed by elected District Assemblies (DAs). This reform is likely to unleash a struggle over BVC-VDC relations. But, different visions of decentralisation, shared mistrust of local democracy, higher level battles for au­thority among the government, politicians and TAs stalled the decentralisation process. Donors support­ing these reforms were also mistrustful of representative local institutions. The institutions chosen and recognised by the government under donor pressure are the sites of political struggles in which represen­tation, a sense of belonging and downward accountability are losing ground.

The Great Limpopo is one of the largest Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) in the world, encom­passing vast areas in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. By arguing that residents living in or close to the TFCA will participate in its management and benefit economically, TFCA proponents claim social legitimacy for the project. The establishment of the Great Limpopo required negotiations among the three nation states, different government departments within these states and various donors contrib­uting funds. This article explores how these negotiations and interactions affected the institutional choices made with regards to the management of the Great Limpopo and how these shaped the control and benefits of local residents. This article examines the differences among the different actors in terms of power and capacities, which are often ignored in the promotion of TFCAs. By comparing the experi­ences of local residents in the South African part of the TFCA with those in Mozambique, the cases show how international negotiations interact with national policies of decentralisation to shape and sometimes even disable local government institutions.