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Year : 2015  |  Volume : 13  |  Issue : 3  |  Page : 287-298

The Politics of Natural Resource Enclosure in South Africa and Ecuador

1 Lund University Centre of Excellence for the Integration of Social and Natural Dimensions of Sustainability (LUCID), Lund, Sweden; Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies (LUCSUS), Lund University, Lund, Sweden; Centre for Civil Society (CCS), University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), South Africa
2 Lund University Centre of Excellence for the Integration of Social and Natural Dimensions of Sustainability (LUCID), Lund; Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies (LUCSUS), Lund University, Lund, Sweden

Correspondence Address:
Melissa Hansen
Lund University Centre of Excellence for the Integration of Social and Natural Dimensions of Sustainability (LUCID), Lund, Sweden; Lund University Centre for Sustainability Studies (LUCSUS), Lund University, Lund, Sweden; Centre for Civil Society (CCS), University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), South Africa

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Source of Support: None, Conflict of Interest: None

DOI: 10.4103/0972-4923.170406

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Date of Web Publication24-Nov-2015


The paper examines the ways in which states facilitate 'new enclosures' of natural resources, and the challenges of this as a strategy of development and environmental sustainability. We argue that enclosures introduce significant changes in property regimes, which redefine conditions for the access and control of land and forest, especially for tribal and indigenous communities. In this context, we analyse two state-initiated projects-the iSimangaliso Wetland Park in South Africa, a UNESCO World Heritage site, and the Socio Bosque incentive conservation programme in Ecuador.

Keywords: Enclosure, state-driven development, protected areas, financial incentives for conservation, iSimangaliso Wetland Park, UNESCO World Heritage, South Africa, Ecuador

How to cite this article:
Hansen M, Islar M, Krause T. The Politics of Natural Resource Enclosure in South Africa and Ecuador. Conservat Soc 2015;13:287-98

How to cite this URL:
Hansen M, Islar M, Krause T. The Politics of Natural Resource Enclosure in South Africa and Ecuador. Conservat Soc [serial online] 2015 [cited 2020 Jul 10];13:287-98. Available from: http://www.conservationandsociety.org/text.asp?2015/13/3/287/170406

   Introduction Top

Under increasing scarcity and competition for natural resources, various political and economic instruments that aim to combine environmental objectives with socioeconomic development goals, have been implemented around the world (Ostrom 2010; Ring et al. 2010; Corbera and Schroeder 2011; Fischer et al. 2012). These are often put forward in combination with policies that strengthen state control over natural resources. However realising 'win-win' outcomes and minimising trade-offs between environment and socioeconomic development remains a challenge (Muradian et al. 2013). People and communities often experience negative impacts from state interventions in the name of conservation, for instance a loss of access to natural resources (Murray Li 2007; Boyd 2009; Petheram and Campbell 2010; Bernstein 2011). We examine the ways, in which states facilitate 'new enclosures' of natural resources, and the challenges of these interventions as a strategy of development and environmental sustainability. 'New enclosures' are introduced under international initiatives for sustainable development, which are often integrated, interpreted and operationalised in the national modernisation and economic growth policies of states. We show that particular natural resources, such as biodiversity and forests, are being subjected to the neoliberalisation of nature, through alternative mechanisms to natural resource extraction (Polanyi 1944; Bridge 2007).

Scholars vary in the ways in which they conceptualise enclosure, from 'primitive accumulation', to dispossession, to privatisation, and to creating new property rights and claims (Peluso 2007). Heynen and Robbins (2005) define enclosure as the capture of common resources and the exclusion of the communities to which these common resources belong; using the concept to demonstrate the neoliberalisation of nature. Critical scholars like Fairhead et al. (2012) label enclosures justified by environmental conservation as 'green grabbing'. They argue that this ultimately serves a discursively constructed global green agenda, which aims for the protection of biodiversity and the mitigation of global climate change while redefining the control of and access to natural resources. Our analysis draws on Blomley's (2007) definition, which, denotes enclosure as the transformation of common resources into exclusively owned spaces, and the embedded loss of long-standing common rights to natural resources.

There is a growing academic interest in studying processes, where contemporary nature conservation is combined with the goals of environmental sustainability and economic development. In particular, the implementation of new rules and market mechanisms for conservation management, by creating and changing property regimes for various natural resources, is increasingly problematised in the literature (Heynen 2005, Murray Li 2007, Hansen 2013). In this context, private property rights of different types of natural resources, including rivers, forests, oceans and even carbon stored in trees, need to be specified-based on arguments that formalised the private property rules lead to a better management of these resources, and will, ultimately, act as a means to combat further environmental deterioration (McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Heynen et al. 2007; White et al. 2012). However, neither the emergence of new conservation projects nor their significant impacts, for instance, on customary ties and community dynamics, are adequately discussed. We aim to fill this gap and explore the emergence of 'new enclosures': 1) the global and national drivers, 2) the transformation of property regimes, and 3) the impacts on customary ties and local institutions. We use two empirical cases of state driven conservation projects: 1) the iSimangaliso Wetland Park (IWP), a protected area in South Africa, and 2) the Programa Socio Bosque (=Socio Bosque Programme, PSB)-a governmental conservation incentives programme in Ecuador.

The following three aspects guide us in the comparative analysis and critical discussion: 1) the emergence of enclosures-outlining the role of global and national discourses in legitimising natural resource enclosure, 2) new rules and property regimes-showing institutional changes in the use, access, and control of resources, and 3) conflicts and/or benefits-discussing the impacts on customary ties and power dynamics between and within communities. For the empirical cases we use data gathered during extensive field research in South Africa and Ecuador, between 2010 and 2012. In the South African case, data were collected primarily through semistructured and open interviews with key informants and experts from government agencies, as well as local community members who live at KwaDapha, a 'tribal authority' area, within the Coastal Forest Reserve section of the IWP. Household visits with half of the 49 households at KwaDapha, as well as two focus group meetings (one attended only by women) contributed substantively to understand the local realities and everyday lives of people who are affected by the changing rules regarding access to natural resources. In Ecuador, we collected data through 101 structured interviews in five indigenous Amazonian Kichwa communities, who participate in the PSB. Furthermore, we conducted semistructured interviews with relevant government representatives, as well as non-governmental organisations, and experts from the private sector.

Before introducing the selected cases in terms of their respective political and economic settings, we discuss the politics of 'new enclosures' by referring to contemporary shifts of global environmental goals towards biodiversity conservation and the mitigation of climate change. In the third and fourth sections, we argue that these global objectives, along with national developmental goals and concomitant institutional changes, introduce 'new enclosures' by changing the property regimes of natural resources. The final section focuses on the tensions and conflicts that arise from the imposition of new rules and property regimes.

   The Politics of Natural Resource Enclosure Top

Harvey (2012) emphasises the relationship between the commons and enclosures by arguing that some enclosures can constitute the best way to preserve certain kinds of valued commons. The idea of nature conservation via enclosing land and forests can be seen as one of the best ways to prevent exploitation, misuse, or degradation of natural resources. Hardin's argument for centralised regulation or privatisation of the commons to deal with the overexploitation of natural resources has often been used by policy makers to justify centralised control of the commons (Hardin 1968; Ostrom et al. 1999). Where plural land ownerships and indigenous rights exist, nature conservation initiatives can be seen as tools, through which states have extended their area of control over tribal and indigenous lands, as they establish new or re-regulated private property regimes (Murray Li 2007; Büscher 2010). States can also extend their control by introducing new approaches in line with economic development, such as market-based instruments in order to motivate conservation. Although it is problematic to assume that a global market regime operates uniformly, new modes of property regimes and economic management for natural resource governance have been effectively normalised worldwide (Castree 2008). For example, Fairhead et al. (2012) highlight market-based trends by referring to various campaigns which invite supporters to buy an acre of land for wildlife preservation. The introduction of new property regimes and accompanying economic tools, such as payments for ecosystem services and carbon trading schemes, have been key to this new approach in enclosures.

The emerging liberal and modernist approaches towards nature conservation are grounded in Locke's theory of property, which legitimises exclusive control mechanisms through the enclosure of land. The concept of enclosure emerged in order to refer to the well-known example in the sixteenth century England, where the fencing of pastures transformed the commons into a resource where commercial flocks could be raised. In this sense, processes of enclosure can constitute a form of privatisation, which results in the formation of new property regimes that are the basis for further commodification, marketisation, and deregulation (Mansfield 2007). The environment is transformed from a source of livelihood, formerly outside market or state control, into an economic resource for national and global production, thus redefining how, and by whom the environment is managed (Illich 1983; Hildyard et al. 2012).

Scholars studying processes of the 'neoliberalisation of nature' have reworked the concept of enclosure, in relation to more recent developments in environmental governance (Harvey 2005; Mansfield 2007; Castree 2008). 'New enclosures' highlight recent shifts in the restructuring of property regimes in relation to access to and control of nature (Heynen et al. 2007; White et al. 2012). Characterised by increasing exclusivity of access to natural resources through private or state control, 'new enclosures' reflect the desire for individual freedom, economic efficiency, and the maintenance of ecological integrity (Heynen et al. 2007). Examples of 'new enclosures' vary depending on what is being enclosed, i.e., ecosystems or specific ecosystem services, or in what terms resources and their use by people are being delimited. In the quest to address global environmental problems ideas of assigning property rights to global commons like oceans, the atmosphere or even the Amazon rainforest (Schiff 2010) can be seen as attempts of 'new enclosures'. Fairhead et al. (2012: 242) criticise the appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends as 'green grabbing', extending the concept of land grabbing towards the commodification of nature more generally. They claim that the processes of green grabbing reflect 'the economy of repair', where environmental destruction in one place can be offset by the preservation of nature and ecosystems in another. In this context, White et al. (2012) have shown how appropriation of land and other natural resources through changes in property rights transform previous owners or users of that land into subjects of economic dependency.

Furthermore, enclosures can generate differential effects depending on their social and environmental embeddedness (Bridge 2007). In this sense, the reorganisation of the community, or the people who are being enclosed, by the rules of the authority is also important for measuring the effects of enclosure. People are enclosed to fit into a new society, where they must learn and accustom themselves to new arrangements such as learning to prepare and manage budget proposals or learning to live with wild animals. These new rules shift the reference points by which people or their livelihoods are valued (Hildyard et al. 2012).

   Enclosing Nature: The Examples of South Africa and Ecuador Top

We draw on two projects as illustrative examples of 'new enclosures'. Both are state led with the environmental objectives of biodiversity conservation and the reduction of deforestation. They are thus legitimised by international sustainability discourses, fostered by global institutions such as UNESCO. They demonstrate the 'economy of repair' embedded in the global strive for sustainability. Environmental degradation in one place, e.g., industrialised countries, is 'offset' by financing environmental conservation in another place, e.g., tropical forest and biodiversity rich developing countries. Moreover, both projects are based on 'win-win' policies that aim to combine nature conservation with economic development. In the South African case, state-centric conservation management is combined with private tourism. In the Ecuadorian case, monetary incentives are used as a motivation for environmental stewardship.

Protected area conservation: South Africa's iSimangaliso Wetland Park

In 1994, South Africa made the regime change from apartheid to democracy; and has formulated policy and passed legislation that seeks to redress past racial imbalances (Ntshona et al. 2010). This is especially important in the context of conservation, as the apartheid-era approach of 'fencing and fines' often dispossessed local people of land through forced relocations, and led to inequality in access to natural resources based on race. The iSimangaliso Wetland Park (IWP) in Maputaland, South Africa's first UNESCO World Heritage Site, strives to be a new model for protected area development and management. The policy framework for the IWP promotes the view that protected areas can provide a synergy between conservation and economic development, through private ecotourism development (IWPA 2008: 11). This approach emphasises the role of protected areas in broader conservation and development agendas (Hansen 2013). This strategy can be viewed as an example of state-managed neoliberalism, where resources are enclosed and controlled by the state, which at the same time aims to facilitate private investment in tourism inside the IWP.

iSimangaliso Wetland Park Authority (IWPA) manages the IWP on behalf of the state. IWPA's major objective is to ensure that the development of the IWP is based on ecotourism as the primary land use option, integrating both the conservation of World Heritage and local economic development. IWPA reports directly to the Department of Environmental Affairs, Government of South Africa from which it receives its core funding (DEAT 2009). It has a board of nine members, who represent business, traditional council's, land claimants, as well as national, provincial and local government (DEAT 2009).

There have been a total of 14 land claims in the IWP. Three of these were settled in 1998 and 2002, six in 2007, and five remained to be settled until 2013 (IWPA 2010). In the case of successful land claims, land title has been transferred to the claimant communities, but with limited user rights. Management remains under the IWPA; and land rights are implemented through co-management agreements. The co-management process includes representatives of IWPA and the land claims committee, usually made up of tribal authority members in a given community. As people have not moved back onto the land, this represents a portrayal of land as a productive asset, rather than as a social right to property (Nustad 2011). The community of KwaDapha falls under the Coastal Forest Reserve land claim, which is yet to be settled. The land belongs to a Zulu tribal trust, the iNgonyama Trust.

Enclosure in the iSimangaliso Wetland Park plays out in two ways. Firstly, the park has consolidated previously disparate areas of land, into one protected area, often with borders and fencing. For adjacent communities however, access to natural resources in the IWP (for example land for grazing and agriculture) has been an important social and economic norm. Tribal authority leaders of the Mbila, Makhasa, Nibela, and Mnqobokazi communities adjacent to the IWP have all criticised the construction of a fence as potentially limiting their access to natural resources that are considered important for traditional use, economic use, health and food. Even where gates allow access, the communities are not confident that they will be allowed in. Representatives of three of these four communities have refused to allow a fence. The other community has permitted the erection of a fence, even though the residents knowingly ignore the IWPA's rules for access to the park. For instance, a tribal authority representative of the Mnqobokazi community explained that the tribal authority was not complying with the IWPA's requests to restrict cattle grazing in the park, because the authority was not 'listening to them'. For people living in the IWP, fencing means that they are enclosed with dangerous wildlife, frequently with negative impacts upon their livelihood strategies.

Secondly, enclosures take place as the enclosure of land has been reinforced through a strengthened legal framework for conservation-and a global impetus as a UNESCO World Heritage site. Management choices, decision-making structures, and policies in support of conserving a World Heritage Site, are guided by discourses around global conservation. Although local needs are acknowledged, the World Heritage status of the IWP means that some decisions have been taken beyond the bounds of the local area (Hansen, Ramasar and Buchanan 2014). Residents of KwaDapha did not participate in the designation of the Kosi Bay area as part of a World Heritage Site. In reference to this, a community member at KwaDapha said, "iSimangaliso has stolen this area. They [the IWPA] were supposed to ask our permission to declare this a World Heritage Site. We are confused because we haven't even seen the papers that say this is a World Heritage Site."

Local people also expressed the perception that they have no voice in future plans for the Kosi Bay area. A community based development committee had submitted an application to the IWPA to develop a diving lodge, in partnership with an external investor. However, they had not received a reply since submitting their application in 2009. They believed that this was because the IWPA had other plans for the area. One community member stated that: "[w]e do have our own plans, but our plans do not matter so much because they [the IWPA] have their own plans."

There have also been both civil and criminal cases taken against conservation transgressors in the IWP, under the World Heritage Convention Act. For example, as of August 2, 2011, there had been at least three concluded civil cases, one concluded criminal case, and there remained one outstanding criminal case, against local people in the Coastal Forest Reserve section of the IWP, for the construction of illegal tourist accommodation (Savides 2011). Community members often perceived a lack of jobs in KwaDapha as a result of the restrictions on local tourism development initiatives. These perceptions were evident in discussions about the Kosi Bay Beach Camp. There had been a decrease in the number of tourists staying at the Camp, with community members arguing that this was a result of court action against a white partner, responsible for advertising the camp. Even official maps for the IWP are silent about the Camp, although responsibility for day-to-day management had been transferred from Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife to the community in 2001.

Voluntary conservation for 20 years: Ecuador's PSB

The Republic of Ecuador has been shaped by a history of formal colonisation by Spain and internal colonisation and land reforms, which marginalised many Indigenous groups. Primarily in the Andean highlands and the coastal areas, where land was more accessible and suitable for farming, agricultural development has displaced Indigenous people from their traditional lands. In the Amazon region, these processes started in the 1950s and 1960s with the discovery of oil and infrastructural development to access oil and other natural resources. Decades of oil production and mining sparked colonisation and migration from the Andes to the Amazon lowlands, which resulted in Ecuador having one of the highest rates of deforestation in South America (FAO 2011; MAE 2011). Particularly in the northern Amazon region oil exploitation, a history of oil spills, environmental pollution and has transformed the land substantially (Mena et al. 2006; Widener, 2007; Finer et al. 2008). However, most of the negative impacts, such as the health problems due to pollution from oil exploitation, are borne by local and Indigenous people in the Amazon (San Sebastián et al. 2001; Hurtig and San Sebastián 2002), while the majority of economic benefits flow to other parts of the country (Sawyer 2004). Indigenous communities in the rural Amazon are still among the poorest section of the population, lacking access to health care and education (INEC 2010; Mideros 2012).

In September 2008, the Government of Ecuador launched the PSB. It has multiple objectives: 1) the reduction of deforestation, 2) protection of biodiversity, provision of hydrological services and carbon storage, and 3) poverty alleviation and development in rural areas (MAE 2008). Legally recognised land titles are a precondition for participation. In return for committing themselves to conserve native ecosystems on their land, participants receive biannual incentives disbursed to their bank account. The conservation agreements have a duration of 20 years; and the amount of incentives is based on the size of the area protected, the type of ecosystem (forest or native Andean grasslands), and the type of property right distinguishing between collective (e.g., an Indigenous community) or individual landowner (Krause and Loft, 2013). Participants have to comply with a number of rules, including an agreement not to change the vegetation land cover, to report any changes to it (either natural or through invasion or illegal logging by third parties), not to hunt for commercial purposes, and to adequately mark the conservation area (MAE 2008). The terms of conservation agreement also require investment plans that detail how the incentives will be used by the participants (de Koning et al. 2011; MAE 2012). For collective participants, most of which are Indigenous communities, the investment plans must be developed by community members in a democratic and inclusive way; and updated every year (MAE 2009). Communities may have a set of their own rules for the conservation area, in addition to those specified by the agreement terms; often including a complete restriction of hunting and fishing (Krause and Zambonino 2013).

One effective way that builds on the economic rationality of people who convert and degrade ecosystems for income generation is to provide financial incentives or payments for ecosystem services derived from the conservation of land and resources (Wunder 2007; Engel et al. 2008; Pirard and Karsenty 2009). Socio Bosque is a relatively innovative idea diverging from classical conservation efforts, as it also recognises conservation stewards and motivates landowners to continue to commit themselves to conservation. Socio Bosque does not measure the additional environmental benefit that most payments for ecosystem services and reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) schemes require (Wunder 2007; Angelsen et al. 2012). Although legal land titles are a precondition, being part of Socio Bosque gives participants a sense of getting official recognition. This represents an additional motivation, because it eases access to other governmental programmes (pers. comm. interview with local community members, 2010). Moreover, the official signboards, that are used to mark the conservation areas, are a new tool for landowners to claim their property status vis-à-vis outsiders, who are deterred from entering the conservation area and extract resources.

Processes of enclosure in Socio Bosque occur in two ways and on different levels. Firstly, people who are not the legal owners of a resource are now excluded from using that resource, although they may have done so in the past. Secondly, in the case of collective landowners, enclosure is the process in which a common resource, such as a communal forest area, is no longer available for use by all members of the community. The decision to join PSB has to be taken by a community assembly, where a majority of community members have to be in favour of the idea to dedicate a predetermined area of the communal territory to conservation. However, these decisions are not embraced by all people who live in the community. Some people are facing a higher cost of conservation than others. They have lost a source of income (timber, hunting, potential agricultural land) with little to no compensation or personal benefits in return. This is particularly so for people who have not yet obtained a full community member status which does not allow them to partake in important decisions (Krause et al. 2013). In addition, because decision-making in communities is also subject to Indigenous peoples' right for self determination (ILO 2009) there is a trade-off in how far the government can and should intervene in the internal processes of these communities without infringing on their right to self determination.

   The Emergence of 'New' Resource Enclosures Top

In this section we examine how the two presented cases of enclosures are connected to broader discursive frames, institutions, or networks (Castree 2008). Although both cases are influenced by international sustainability discourses and institutions, they are adapted and modified to the national contexts by the respective governments. For instance, the governance framework of the IWP in South Africa, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, is based on normative discourses of sustainability that are dominant at the global level, specifically those of inter-generational justice and global biodiversity conservation. At the same time, the World Heritage Convention Act is integrated into South African domestic legislation, with a strong emphasis on South Africa's post-apartheid priorities, including intersectional justice, human rights and social development (RSA 1999).

Resource enclosures in Ecuador have been primarily introduced through strategies for climate change mitigation and attempts to benefit from a global carbon market. Socio Bosque was designed and implemented at a time when the international carbon market was thriving and an international REDD+ mechanism was conceived. Thus, the prospects of financial support for reduced and avoided emissions through a potential REDD+ mechanism have been strong (pers. comm., Ministry of Environment, 2011). Moreover, PSB was created as a means to support the poverty reduction and environmental conservation goals of Ecuador's national development plan (SENPLADES 2009).

The two cases illustrate how international sustainability goals and initiatives are integrated, interpreted and operationalised in national modernisation and economic growth policies. In the case of South Africa's IWP, priorities are given to economic investments, job creation and the establishment of internationally competitive sectors, energy and tourism respectively. In both cases, the 'new enclosures' aim to generate economic growth by making maximum use of the 'underutilised' resources, and to maximise job creation. For instance, the IWP's collaboration with the governments of Mozambique and Swaziland aims to ensure regional growth by creating the 'conditions for the establishment of an internationally competitive tourism destination' (Moosa 2000). This is also justified by national and regional normative discourses. South Africa's post-Apartheid priorities of intersectional justice, human rights and social development are stressed in the World Heritage Convention Act, which has a strong emphasis on locally beneficial economic development (RSA 1999).

The Ecuadorian approach is a strong example of the inter linkage between developmental and environmental objectives (de Koning et al. 2011). The recognition of the value of the Ecuadorian natural capital is strongly connected to global environmental governance, and promotes the country as one of the front runners in Latin America in relation to the governance and conservation of natural resources. In addition, Socio Bosque can be considered as a representative in a suite of international efforts geared towards 'green growth' and the green economy, and thus attempts for the commodification of ecosystems and their services.

Transformation of property regimes and new rules

According to Robbins and Luginbuhl (2008), enclosure requires changes in the institutional structure that distributes and transfers access rights at the state level. Property regime changes are introduced by states through recentralisation and perpetuation of state ownership of resources (Phelps et al. 2010). This can be problematic because local people are often excluded from accessing natural resources for their livelihoods. For the cases presented here, various discourses that seek to legitimise the transformation of property regimes, such as environmental protection, are used to justify changes of property regimes initiated by the state. In the process of these transformations, new rules for resource use or access to resources are introduced and enforced at the local level, impacting people in different ways. In the subsequent section, we briefly outline how property regimes have changed in the two cases, and discuss which new rules have been introduced.

In the case of IWP, the recentralisation and perpetuation of state control of land has occurred in three ways. Firstly, where land claims are settled, although title is transferred, the IWPA remains the overall manager of the land. Secondly, the consolidation of the IWP has resulted in the imposition of new rules of governance through the World Heritage Convention Act, which limits access to natural resources in the park, considered important for social and economic development and livelihoods (for example land for grazing and agriculture). Thirdly, the consolidation of state control in the park through the World Heritage Convention Act has meant that social and economic development opportunities for people residing within the park have become limited. This relates to what has been called a hybridised community based natural resource management (CBNRM) (Dressler and Büscher 2008). Here private sector investments support 'integrated conservation and development', or tourism-based CBNRM, without reinvesting in the resource base of rural households.

The IWPA aims to provide benefits for local peoples in the form of material gains, corresponding with the conception of the IWP as a 'commercial asset'. For example, local economic development is strived for though equity partnerships between the private sector and mandatory community partners in tourism development, as well as the procurement of goods and services from small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs) for infrastructural development within the IWP (IWPA 2008). With regard to job creation, local communities have been employed in programmes, such as LandCare projects, within the IWP (rehabilitation of degraded land and the removal of alien vegetation). These provide employment over the short term, usually six months. The programmes also support short term employment in infrastructural upgrading (National Assembly Committee on Water and Environmental Affairs 2012). Other socioeconomic development projects include Tourism Skills Development, where local people are trained in hospitality, guiding, and as chefs. In addition, the IWPA provides environmental education programmes and bursaries to university students from communities within and adjacent to the IWP, specifically to pursue environmental studies and related disciplines. According to the IWPA, the approach here focuses on optimising local employment opportunities; empowering local communities through training and the transfer of skills, and seeking and channeling funds to address community needs (Interview, February 14, 2010).

In Ecuador, the incentives transferred to local communities can only achieve long term development if economic projects are set up, that lead to a long term income generation. Many communities cite ecotourism as an income generating activity and pursue this idea with the incentive money. Until now, however, most of the incentives are spent to fulfil basic needs, not leaving an immediate long term impact.

Socio Bosque tries to foster a new land use that is based foremost on the conservation and protection of natural resources. Land is neither directly privatised nor re-centralised as such, but the transformation that takes place leads to a de-facto strengthening of existing private and communal land claims vis-à-vis third parties or outsiders; who are now deterred from infringing on these areas (personal observations and interviews). PSB participants are required to delineate and mark the conservation areas and ensure that vegetation cover is unchanged, and that no illegal logging and commercial hunting takes place. The borders of the conservation area are kept visible, with signs posted along them in order to deter potential intruders. In case of detected intrusion or change to the vegetation cover, the Ministry of Environment has to be notified within five days of the incident (MAE 2012). However, poaching or illegal logging goes easily unnoticed, especially in large and remote areas where access and control is difficult. In some cases intrusions by third parties have led to the clearing of land in conservation areas for agriculture, or selective logging and poaching, which results in conflicts.

A new and particularly interesting transformation of property regimes is the delineation of ownership over ecosystem services, such as carbon sequestration and storage. Under the Ecuadorian constitution land can belong to either a natural person or a legal entity, such as an Indigenous community (República del Ecuador 2008). However, this does not mean that a particular ecosystem service belongs to or can be appropriated by the respective land owner (Garzón 2009). Similarly to mineral rights, which in most countries belong to the government, the production and utilisation of ecosystem services can only be regulated by the Ecuadorian state (República del Ecuador 2008). Although landowners are motivated through financial incentives to conserve their land, the state retains the right to market these services. This creates a new form of enclosure, with a less tangible and visible material base, but nonetheless real. It is not the timber of the tree or even the tree in itself, but the various ecological functions a tree performs that becomes valuable for society and a new resource, which is now controlled by the state. Whilst the financial incentives are the carrot, enforcement and control become part of the stick. In one community we visited, members talked about wanting to split up the collective land in order to benefit individually from the Socio Bosque incentives. Although it is not possible to partition collective land titles under the current Ecuadorian law, there is a risk that fostering an economic logic among people will lead to an erosion of the sense of community through the furthering of individualism and self-regarding behaviour as a result of payments (Bowles 2008; Vatn 2010).

   Social Conflicts and Benefits Top

Enclosures impose a change on the society by introducing new rules and arrangements, in which, people need to accustom themselves. In this sense, new rules also affect the networks of power in which the society is governed and organised (Hildyard et al. 2012). Power relations become visible, both within and between communities that have long used natural resources. In other words, it matters where families, individuals and communities stand after the enclosure of natural resources. There is always a 'fence' that defines how, and by whom the common resources are used or preserved, creating politics of exclusion and related conflicts.

Enclosure's differentiated social and economic effects, and the creation of economic dependencies

Firstly, there have been differentiated social and economic effects of enclosure, depending upon existing relations of wealth, land and power (Islar 2012). In the IWP case, tourism facilities established before the IWP proclamation have been allowed to stay, whilst new tourism developments have been severely penalised, with court cases and fines. This is problematic as those who have private businesses are usually economically better off than those trying to provide an income for themselves through tourism more recently.

Moreover, opportunities and benefits have been unequally distributed among communities in the IWP, especially with regard to successful land claims with settled co-management agreements, versus on-going claims. For example, the Coastal Forest land claim is yet to be settled, which in practice has meant that the community has not been recognised as a stakeholder in the management of the IWP. This also means that the community has received little benefit from the proclamation of the IWP as a World Heritage Site (limited to short term jobs), while their economic and subsistence activities have been significantly constrained.

In Ecuador, Socio Bosque led to differentiated economic benefits and costs. While at a national level, individual landowners are favoured by the existing incentive structure that is applied by the programme to determine and calculate the amount of incentives to be paid; communities continue to receive substantially less when calculated on a per capita or per hectare basis (Krause and Loft 2013). Moreover, within communities, there are clear indications that inequities exist with regard to who benefits and who, or which group, tends to bear the costs. Particularly marginalised groups, women and people who are not full community members, are often excluded from decision-making that concerns the management of the incentive income (Krause et al. 2013). Tensions among people within participating communities are likely to increase in the future, if these inequities are not addressed in time.

In each of these two cases, we have found that after the enclosures, economic dependencies have been created at the local level. In the IWP, local people become beneficiaries, both in private and state sector. The approach to ecotourism is primarily the one where private investors are encouraged to develop tourism infrastructure. With the exceptions of training provided to the 12 employed tour guides, the environmental education programme and bursaries, benefits are mostly in the form of material gains-usually short term jobs provided by state and private sector interests. On the other hand, new rules impose significant constraints on access to resources and livelihood activities. Again, this is a policy framework that views the IWP as a commercial asset, rather than a social-ecological resource that supports people's livelihoods.

The creation of economic dependencies is a particular challenge for Socio Bosque. Long term forest conservation can only be achieved if either the payments continue, and likely also rise, in perpetuity, or if participants use the incentives for local socioeconomic development projects in line with conservation objectives. For example, ecotourism projects, although not a silver bullet, can substitute the need for selling illegally logged timber. Yet, as of now, there is little evidence that the incentives are used for that. Primarily, communities spend the incentive payments on satisfying basic needs, such as improved access to healthcare; emergency health fund; small pensions for seniors; scholarships and educational material; and basic daily consumer goods. However, PSB has the ambition to help communities to initiate projects that will provide an income in the future, in order to decrease dependence on incentives in the long run.

Enclosure's impact upon customary ties and institutions

Dressler and Büscher (2008) have argued that with the enclosure of commons as commodified land, new property relations increasingly cut customary ties and institutions, by placing both under the auspices of self-regulating markets. This is corroborated by our findings, which, show that enclosures in each of the two case studies have had some impact upon customary ties and institutions. In South Africa, traditional government is formally recognised and allowed to act through customary law, functioning within the local governance sphere (RSA 2003, Chapter 12). Nevertheless, the formation of the IWP has in practice led to questions around the role of the iNkosi (chief or king) in the Tembe Tribal Area (TTA). This is illustrated through the following quote from a community member at KwaDapha: "The King has no say about communities from Mabibi along the coast. He is on the Board of iSimangaliso. Before, we believed that the King was looking after this place. After iSimangaliso took over we got confused about who our leader is" (Interview, September 6, 2012).

The restructuring of rules and authority over the access, use, and management of resources can have further alienating effects (Hansen 2014). Sunde and Isaacs (2008), report that many people from the Mabibi community are unaware of the potential benefits flowing to them, from the Thonga Beach Lodge and the Mabibi community campsite. They cite the hierarchical structure of the local tribal authority as one of the reasons for this (Sunde and Isaacs 2008). Mthethwa (2002) argues that the reshaping of old ethnic identities and the local leadership's mobilisation of history in Maputaland is inspired by the envisaged economic benefits to be derived from the advent of ecotourism.

Decisions that affect how people are able to access and use common resources need to take into account customary ties as well as local institutions. In Ecuador, with the conservation agreements comes a set of formal rules and requirements, such as the requirement for democratic and inclusive decision-making, and a documented financial management of the incentive payments. For instance, depending on how the incentives are managed at the community level and how people living in the communities are able to participate in the decision-making processes, affects people's livelihoods. However, functioning democratic institutions with inclusive participatory processes at the communal level are required in order to realise long-term socioeconomic benefits. Where institutions at the community level do not work and existing power structures marginalise some groups within the community, incidences of conflict regarding land use and incentive management arise (Krause et al. 2013). These conflicts have implications on communities and traditional form of land management in the long term.

Enclosure driven social conflicts

Social conflicts arose as the enclosures have changed the patterns of access and control of resources, and led to uneven distribution of benefits and costs. This has been primarily through the creation of mistrust between people and the state but also towards the village headmen, within families and between relatives. In the IWP case, there are obvious conflicts between local people and the IWPA. Local people complain that the IWPA has developed its own plans in the area, without their consultation. Some community members have been accused of informing the IWPA about construction occurring on different homesteads, and about the use of gill nets in illegal fishing activities. Two arenas, where social conflicts are particularly visible in the IWP, are around fencing and punitive actions taken against local conservation transgressors.

For local people, fencing often symbolically represents power relations that lead to their continued exclusion from access to resources, decision-making, and co-management (Hansen 2014). For example, tribal authority leaders of the Mbila, Makhasa, Nibela, and Mnqobokazi communities, adjacent to the IWP, have criticised the construction of a fence, because it is potentially limiting their access to natural resources, that are considered important for economic and traditional use (Hansen, Ramasar and Buchanan 2014). According to tribal authority leaders, fences between the IWP and adjacent communities have been cut down at various times and locations.

The second arena of social conflict in the IWP has been punitive actions taken against conservation transgressors. There have been both civil and criminal cases against local tourism initiatives in the Coastal Forest Reserve Section of the IWP. The applicants in these cases-the Minister of Water and Environmental Affairs, the IWPA, and Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife-feared that the IWP would suffer irreparable damage, that it might lose its status as a World Heritage Site, and that the communities that could benefit through controlled management of the park might suffer hardship, unless unlawful occupiers were stopped and evicted before it was too late (Kuppan 2009). The IWPA likened these tourism development initiatives to ecological theft (Kuppan 2009). Nevertheless, two of our interviewees said that they believed they had gone through the necessary channels for authorisation-receiving the go-ahead from the local tribal leader and the owners of the land, the iNgonyama Trust (Interview, September 7, 2011).

Two types of conflicts in the PSB, rooted in the process of restricting access to and ultimately enclosing forest resources, are of particular interest. Firstly, with the participation in Socio Bosque, communities need to be able to detect intrusion by third parties that leads to logging and poaching, but also to detect changes to the vegetation cover of the conservation area done by members of the participating community. This requires well-functioning monitoring approaches. When outsiders who intrude on the conservation areas to extract resources (timber, bush meat, etc.) or convert land for agriculture are detected by the landowners who partake in Socio Bosque, the Ministry of Environment and the police have to be informed. When people from the participating community itself are violating the rules of the conservation agreement, internally derived sanctions may apply, ranging from the payment of a fine to the expulsion from the community (Krause and Zambonino 2013). In addition, signs of determent inside the conservation area are used to deter people who intend to interfere with the conservation area, such as illegal logging. For instance, these signs portray satellites that monitor the forest area and are able to detect any changes, thus, discouraging people from any violation of the conservation rules. The monitoring, which is supposedly carried out by the government, directly controls behaviour. For example, when asked about the new limitations for forest use, an interviewee stated that, "If we cut and they see us with satellites, we can be taken to prison."

The second type of emergent conflict is found within participating communities. It underlines how new or existing conflicts due to historical land titling and territorial control by community groups are exacerbated by the introduction of new rules intended for conservation. Theory on common resource management advocates that institutions play an important role in determining the capacity of a community to manage natural resources (Leach et al. 1999; Cleaver 2000; Ostrom 2010). More than 85% of the current conservation areas in the programme are owned by communities (PSB 2013). Previous research indicates that some communities lack the capacities to equitably manage and distribute the benefits they receive from participating in PSB (Pachamama 2010; Rojas et al. 2011). Socio Bosque's economic incentive instrument was initiated in order to 'improve' communal natural resources management. However, there have been accounts where incentives have not reached the majority of community members, or where community leaders have benefited more. For example, in one community we visited, the former leader used the conservation payments to purchase a car for private use, violating the terms of the conservation agreement (Interview, July 13, 2011). Internal community conflicts about benefit distribution and land use are a destabilising factor and present a risk for the management of common land in the long run. This is partly a result of low levels of participation and transparency in the decision-making processes around PSB and the accompanying lack of knowledge about the programme (Krause et al. 2013).

   Comparative Dimensions Top

[Table 1] shows that there are three main differences between the two cases of conservation enclosures from South Africa and Ecuador. First, the regional economic growth paradigm has been more dominant in the case of IWP; whereas it plays a subordinate role in the design of Socio Bosque. Although Ecuador's principle economic income is based on oil exploitation in the Amazon region, PSB aims to promote conservation on private lands and to alleviate poverty among participating landowners.{Table 1}

Secondly, property rights have been formalised in South Africa through settled land claims, while there has been no formalisation of property rights in Ecuador.

Thirdly, the uneven distribution of costs and benefits of 'new enclosures', fostered resistance in the IWP. The consolidation of the IWP has led to questions around the role of the tribal authorities, and communities have shown civil disobedience by putting up their own fences and camp sites. In Ecuador, however, there is little to no resistance by participating communities, primarily because PSB is a voluntary programme, and if landowners and communities are not agreeing to the conservation contracts or the incentives, they do not join the programme. Nevertheless, enclosures create a different tension especially at the intracommunity level as new conservation agreements have instigated a set of formal rules and requirements regarding local decision-making, which are relatively recent ideas in Indigenous communities, and which often do not work as envisioned.

Despite these differences, we have seen in both examples that an economic dependency has been created. In the IWP, local people become beneficiaries in private and state sector interests through the provision of material gains, such as short term jobs. Nonetheless, there are positive outcomes at various scales in relation to the environmental goals of these projects. For instance in the IWP and Socio Bosque, ecosystems that were not covered under the national conservation legislation, are now protected. Yet, attention must be paid to social conflicts and the uneven distribution of costs and benefits originating from these projects, both within local stakeholder groups as well as among different groups.

In the IWP, conservation through protected area development is tied to state power. Through private tourism, a new set of social, and socioecological values and norms are introduced, based upon market-based conceptions of conservation and development. This substitutes the direct use of natural resources with indirect alternative forms of economic development (Whande 2010).

Similarly, in Ecuador, the government uses economic incentives for landowners in order to achieve environmental objectives alongside socioeconomic development goals. In this process, however, land, that is now under conservation, is being transformed from being communally managed and controlled, to an area, uses of which are severely restricted by the government for a 20 year time period. Landowners have to comply with strict obligations that are enforced and controlled by the state, and when the obligations are violated landowners and communities face sanctions. This is particularly worrying for some Indigenous communities with weak institutions and where certain groups of people are marginalised by existing internal hierarchies. Without appropriate, transparent and bottom-up decision-making processes that are really focusing on local institutions and the effective participation as well as equitable benefit sharing, the financial incentive approach risks to exacerbate existing inequalities and further marginalise vulnerable groups at the community level.

   Conclusion Top

Enclosures are analysed from a critical perspective by arguing that conservation enclosures have become instruments for state territorialisation as they create a 'new ecological order' by redefining how and by whom environment is managed (Hildyard, Lohmann and Sexton 2012: 21). Using the concept of enclosure has allowed us to illustrate this 'new ecological order' in the context of conservation projects as natural resources are turned into objects of governance with new rules and property relations. Natural resource enclosures have been legitimised through international sustainability ambitions. We have found that both the IWP and Socio Bosque are driven by international discourses on sustainable development by using conservation as a mechanism that complies with global biodiversity interests and climate change mitigation. This fits well with the arguments of the new enclosure scholars: new forms of enclosures reflect the desire for individual freedoms, economic efficiency and the maintenance of ecological integrity.

Changes in property regimes and introduction of new rules are crucial in creating the new ecological order for the enclosed society. As it is documented in the case of Socio Bosque, conservation agreements create new borders for the land where members of the community have to rethink their old practices and change the ways they use land. In the IWP 'fences' makes enclosure visible both for the people and the land. Both cases also highlighted that enclosed societies have to accustom new rules and restrictions as old practices are now considered illegal. Several court cases against local people by IWP also show how the state territorialisation is implemented and illustrates existing power relations between the state authorities and tribal communities. In this sense the IWP case differs from Socio Bosque as local communities are not only alienated from land, but they also left out of management practices.

Enclosures scholars have showed that appropriation of land and other natural resources transform previous owners or users of that land into subjects of economic dependency. After the enclosures, communities searched for new livelihood strategies and in both cases ecotourism is cited as an income generating activity. This is an illustration of how enclosures could facilitate commodification of recreation and biodiversity.

   Acknowledgements Top

We thank everyone who reviewed earlier versions of this paper and who shared ideas and comments for improvement. Our gratitude also goes to the many people in South Africa and Ecuador who were willing to dedicate time for interviews and narrative walks. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the LUCID Research School for inspiring discussions, and we are of course alone responsible for any shortcomings.[81]

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